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1.1 Introduction
I hope that his own definition will be heeded; for the term is so awe-inspiring,
and the phenomenon it describes so dramatic and novel, that it is very easy for
misconceptions to take root. (Hecksher, 1964, p. vii)
August Hecksher is a name that is not necessarily instantly recognizable as being
pivotal to the intellectual development of research on megaregions. Yet his words offer
a profound insight into what lies at the heart of a critical research agenda for those of us
whose interest in megaregions has brought us to contribute to this edited collection.
When you consider the term Hecksher is alluding to is ‘megalopolis’, and that his quote
appears in the foreword to the paperback edition of Jean Gottmann’s classic 20th-
century urban geography and planning text Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern
Seaboard of the United States1, the relevance to contemporary work on megaregions
starts to become clearer. His words take on added significance when you cast your eye
over just some of the many terms that have been used over the last half century by
geographers and planners to describe the phenomena of sprawling urbanized landscapes
comprising clustered networks of cities: megalopolis … archipelago economy, galactic
city, string city, limitless city, endless city, liquid city, global city-region, world city-
2region, mega-city region, polycentric metropolis, new megalopolis, megapolitan region,
metro region, polynuclear urban region, super urban area, super region … megaregion.
The first question to consider, then, is why are we focusing on megaregions?
After all, if you look back to Peter Taylor and Robert Lang’s (2004) list of 50 names
given to new metropolitan forms, the term megaregion is not present, while the most
recently published ‘dictionaries’ in human geography both omit megaregion – though
interestingly retain entries on ‘megalopolis’ (Castree et al., 2013; Gregory et al., 2009).
Is the term megaregion simply less important than we think it is? Or perhaps the
megaregion is as transient as some of the other concepts listed by Taylor and Lang
(‘cities a la carte’, ‘servurb’ and ‘sprinkler city’) used to account for current or near-
future urban form?
Our starting point is that despite considerable dispute over what the term might
mean, an increasing number of commentators seem willing to agree that megaregions
are important phenomena in globalization. One widely circulated story is that
megaregions constitute globalization’s new urban form. Here commentators appear
convinced that the expansion of globalizing cities into larger city-regions is being
superseded by trans-metropolitan landscapes comprising networked urban centres and
their surrounding area. They appear captivated by a perception that what goes on in
megaregions is foreboding our urban futures. And they seem assured that what occurs in
megaregions constitutes the leading-edge of capitalist endeavour, driving
competitiveness (Ross, 2009) and determining life opportunities (Florida, 2008). From
its origins in the United States (Dewar and Epstein, 2007; Lang and Dhavale, 2005;
Regional Plan Association, 2006), through to its parallels in European spatial planning
(Faludi, 2009), and its spread and application to all manner of different geographical
3contexts (Yang, 2009; Pieterse, 2010; UN-Habitat, 2010; Weller and Boteller, 2013),
there can be little doubt as to the importance currently being attached to the megaregion
concept by its many advocates.
Nowhere is this intellectual buzz and appetite for megaregions more fervent than
in the United States. Inspired by Gottmann’s (1961) prediction that ‘megalopolis’ was
the antecedent to a new spatial order that would emerge nationwide during the late 20th
century, the beginning of the 21st century saw the Regional Plan Association (RPA)
consider making their own statement on what they saw as the current and near-future
‘megaregional’ geography of the United States. Launched in 2005, America 2050 is that
vision. It identifies 11 emerging megaregions as prototypes for balanced and sustainable
growth across the United States during the first half of the 21st century (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 America 2050’s emerging US megaregions with areas of influence
*** Insert Figure 1.1 here ***
Source: America 2050 (2008). Reproduced by permission of the Regional Plan
Association.
The background to America 2050 is significant. It is motivated by both internal and
external pressures: internally, by the lack of federal action to identify and bring forward
investments to reform the physical infrastructure (transport, energy, water) and secure
America’s future global economic competitiveness; externally, by what the RPA
perceive their ‘competitors’ in Europe and Asia are already succeeding at by coupling
specialized economic functions with integrated transportation modes to enable the
efficient movement of workers, goods and information across extended geographical
4areas. What is compelling about the America 2050 map is it represents a belief that
responding to this challenge, first, requires coordination at the megaregion scale, and
second, can only be achieved with new investments in infrastructure development in
and across these 11 megaregions. It is also an argument constructed from a series of
normative assumptions about how our globalizing world is spatially configured.
If you believe the hype, megaregions are the spatial manifestation of economic
activity and are fast ‘becoming the new engines of global and regional economies’ (UN-
Habitat, 2010b, p. 1). This argument is undergirded by a now familiar geoeconomic
logic that in globalization, the largest and densest clusters of socioeconomic activity are
those acting as the most important staging/strategic command posts, and therefore
surging ahead, in todays’ quicksilver global economy. From Florida’s (2008) ‘spiky
world’ riposte to Friedman’s (2005) ‘flat world’ thesis, through to Glaeser’s (2011)
‘triumph of the city’ or Brenner’s (2013b) ‘planetary urbanization’, it is impossible to
avoid the many reference points to the importance of urban economic processes in
globalization. This is ably supported by a geopolitical logic that argues the scale and
pace of urbanization in these locations is now so pervasive that new supra-local scales
of urbanization are being created, which to function effectively require economic
systems and political systems to be geographically aligned. One consequence of this is
how urban expansion is seen to preclude localized solutions to the challenges posed by
advancing globalization.
All of which leads proponents to claim that ‘urban mega-regions are coming to
relate to the global economy in much the same way that metropolitan regions relate to
national economies’ (Florida et al., 2008, p. 460). This statement is significant, bold and
challenging in equal measure: significant, because megaregions are the latest episode in
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spatial/scalar fix for globalized capital accumulation and organizing (inter)national
space economies; bold, because it upholds claims that there is an unbreakable logic
linking megaregions (as space) and megaregionality (as process) with the most
advanced elements of 21st century globalization; and challenging, because why should
megaregions be any different to the other spatial scale corpses, which, having achieved
their own short-lived period of ‘new regionalist’ orthodoxy, came to be swept away in
favour of the latest fashionable and soon-to-be dominant spatial policy tools (Harrison,
2007).
As early as 50 years ago, August Hecksher recognized this very concern. He
observed how a spatial concept (‘megalopolis’) can generate such interest and
excitement amongst academics and practitioners that its true value and meaning gets
lost among the ensuing euphoria and paraphernalia that is its rise to orthodoxy2. It is
precisely in the process of becoming a captured concept that Hecksher warns how easy
it is for ‘misconceptions’ to take root. When a concept is captured it is taken away from
the foundations upon which it has been constructed to be used in a deeply political way
by actors in different contexts who wish to defend or challenge a particular viewpoint.
The further a concept is distanced from its foundations, the greater the danger it will be
misinterpreted, over-extended and inappropriately used by the actor(s) concerned.
Those concepts which do rise to orthodoxy are arguably those at greatest risk of
becoming what the social scientist Andrew Sayer (1992) famously categorized as a
‘chaotic concept’. In this way, the rise of the megaregion prompts us to confront
searching questions about the prospects for megaregionality to achieve the ambitious
goals – enhanced competitiveness, accelerating investment in sustainable transportation
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political proponents currently espouse. For within the current body of literature, no
meaningful attempts have been made to discuss the foundations, frailties and futures of
megaregional research.
This collection aims to instil some coherence into this debate by opening up the
megaregion concept for critical scrutiny. Our starting point is that the rhetoric and can-
do bravado which currently surrounds megaregions has raced too far ahead of the
sustained theoretical and rigorous empirical work needed to support many of the
assertions, assumptions, claims and investments being made in the belief that
megaregions do constitute globalization’s new urban form. In particular, we examine
the opportunities and challenges posed by current approaches to conceptualizing
megaregions, megaregionality, and planning and governing at this scale. We wish to
distinguish between the advances made by new perspectives to analysing megaregions
and megaregionality, providing a clear indication of where these advances differ from
the spurious claims made elsewhere in relation to megaregions.
To achieve this, the chapter is structured as follows. In the first section we aim
to critically examine the foundations upon which the megaregion discourse has been
constructed. In so doing, we conceptualize the position occupied by the megaregion in
debates prior to the onset of globalization, and then discuss how the concept has been
reawakened during globalization. The second section then explores four separate, yet
interrelated, lines of argumentation which cut into the megaregional debate as it is
currently constructed and form the basis for developing a more critical approach toward
megaregional research. We conclude with some cautionary remarks about the
challenges and opportunities for near-future megaregional research.
71.2 Foundations: from megalopolis to megaregions – a new ‘laboratory for urban
growth’
Despite the recent hype surrounding megaregions, the concept itself – or perhaps more
accurately, the foundations upon which it is constructed – has a much longer history, the
length of which remains the subject of some significant conjecture (see Baigent, 2004;
Zhang, 2015). Nevertheless, for our purposes we are taking the beginning of the 20th
century as starting point. This was a time when approximately seven per cent of the
world’s population could be considered urban and there were just sixteen cities with a
population in excess of one million people (Harvey, 2000). It was also when the
eminent Scottish planner and theorist Patrick Geddes (1915) first considered
‘megalopolis’, as both a concept and as a place. In this regard, Geddes actually predates
Gottmann by almost 50 years in recognizing the potential for an urbanized corridor to
extend along the northeastern seaboard of the United States.
In the end Geddes settled on minting the term ‘conurbation’ to develop his ideas
about city evolution and the new urban configurations produced. In fact it was his
contemporary, Lewis Mumford, who was to later pick up the term ‘megalopolis’ to
define the fourth stage of six stages of city evolution (Mumford, 1938). The first three
stages – ‘eopolis’ (village), ‘polis’ (city) and ‘metropolis’ (capital city) – chart the rise
of the city. The final three stages – ‘megalopolis’ (a city of exaggerated size),
‘tyrannopolis’ (overexpansion causing rapid decline) and ‘nekropolis’ (city
abandonment due to war and famine) – chart how great cities fall. For Mumford
‘megalopolis’ is the last vestige of urban development, the tipping point at which city
8development becomes over-development and the signal that a city is about to enter a
period of (terminal) decline and disintegration.
Uniting Geddes and Mumford was their shared conviction that city expansion
became unsustainable once a city reached the size of a megalopolis – though Geddes did
stop someway short of Mumford’s suggestions that unsustainable equalled irreversible
fatality (Meller, 1993). For them and many others writing in the first half of the 20th
century, cities were growing too fast and this meant megalopoli were cast in a negative
light of the ‘city as problem’. Gottmann’s (1957, 1961) outlook on the coming
megalopolises was the complete antithesis. In this way, Gottmann’s labelling of the
northeastern seaboard of the United States ‘megalopolis’ was hugely symbolic.
Gottmann makes explicit his referring back over 2000 years to when the ancient Greeks
planned for a new city-state (to be called Megalopolis), ‘dream[ing] of a great future for
it and hop[ing] it would become the largest of the Greek cities …’ and ‘a symbol of the
long tradition of human aspirations and endeavor’ (Gottmann, 1961, p. 4). While
Geddes and Mumford were fiercely critical of urban sprawl, Gottmann actively
promoted a ferociously modernist and progressive view of the new urban form.
Addressing the still dominant anti-modernist tradition inspired by Geddes and
Mumford, Gottmann (1961, p. 13) goes to the length of asking ‘Are people both in and
out of this extraordinary region united in condemning it?’ to emphasize his very
different perspective on the emerging urban form.
Gottmann describes late-20th-century urban-economic expansion as promising
social and economic fulfilment, enabling the ‘masses’ to access non-manual jobs, better
housing, education and cultural offerings which were seen previously to be the
exclusive domain of ‘elites’. As a message detailing progress and improvement it
9quickly gained favour in the United States, particularly with those whose ancestors had
left behind the European countryside for the North American city. Alongside this, urban
policy elites, so used to hearing anti-urbanist accounts emphasizing the problems
associated with the growth of cities, were ‘flattered, if not surprised, to find their cities
in the van of progress’ (Baigent, 2004, p. 690).
Of course, this exposure brought with it a lot of attention. The term
‘megalopolis’ quickly became shorthand for all that is deemed progressive in (North
American) urban planning. While this is not to say that Gottmann did not acknowledge
the problems associated with megalopolis, it is noticeable that when so doing the
argument veered toward the prophetic: ‘Megalopolis stands indeed at the threshold of a
new way of life, and upon [the] solution of its problems will rest civilization’s ability to
survive’ (Gottmann, 1961, p. 16). In this way, megalopolis was to provide Gottmann
and his contemporaries a ‘laboratory for urban growth’ as the full effect of globalizing
forces began to take hold. Indeed, Gottmann’s legacy arguably lives on in the present
day focus on megaregions.
Often overlooked in Gottmann’s work is the emphasis he placed on both form
and function. We say overlooked because while Gottmann’s work has traditionally been
read for its contribution to informing debates around mapping and planning the
evolving urban form, its structure and its anatomy, dig beneath the surface and you will
find a putative relational economic geography with incipient ideas about the functioning
of the urban system which he went on to develop and expand upon in subsequent works
(Gottmann, 1976; Gottmann and Harper, 1990). Yet the dominant reading of Gottmann
remains centred on his contribution to debates about the evolving urban form (see Lang
and Knox, 2009; Morrill, 2006; Short, 2007; Vicino et al., 2007 for recent re-
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evaluations of the original megalopolis). This is significant because in the emerging
body of work on megaregions, form-dominant approaches to megaregions appear more
influential in the United States, whereas European accounts often adopt a more
functionally-dominant perspective (see Section 1.3.2). In fact, what we have seen over
the past two decades is an attempt to align the functional-dominance of the
geoeconomic global city (region) literature with the form-dominance of traditional
planning thought.
Table 1.1 From megalopolis to megaregions (and beyond)
*** Insert Table 1.1 here ***
Source: Authors
Table 1.1 presents key definitions of the major global urban-regional spatial
configurations that have been identified in the literature. There are four points we take
from this table. The first relates to the geographical context in which these spatial
concepts have their intellectual origins and the specific purpose for which they were
developed. Spatial concepts are not interchangeable. For us, there is a critical distinction
that needs to be made, which helps define and delimit megaregions from other spatial
concepts. Broadly speaking we distinguish between three types of urban-regional spatial
configurations that relate to the global economy. While global city-regions, mega-city
regions and metro(politan) regions relate to one urban system (comprising one or more
cities), a megaregion comprises two or more interrelated urban systems, while planetary
urbanization represents the reach of the global urban system across all geographic space
(Figure 1.2).
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Figure 1.2 A typology of global urban-regional spatial configurations
*** Insert Figure 1.2 here ***
Source: Authors
Meanwhile and somewhat related, second, we would argue there are distinctive
North American and European perspectives on researching large-scale urban-regional
configurations. American perspectives are still rooted in a form-dominant spatial
planning tradition. In contrast, European perspectives, once steeped in discussions about
urban spatial form (Dühr, 2007; Faludi, 2009; Kunzmann, 1996), are now more
commonly associated with functionally-dominant global-city inspired networked
approaches (Hall and Pain, 2006; Hoyler et al., 2008a; Pain and Van Hamme, 2014;
Reades and Smith, 2014; Taylor et al., 2009). Distinguishing between these two
traditions highlights how the type of megaregion that is constructed varies depending on
whether you take rapid urbanization (form) or global economic integration (function) as
your starting point for framing globalized urbanization (Harrison and Hoyler, 2014).
Third, the table neatly reflects Florida’s (2008, p. 38) assertion that ‘bigger and
more competitive economic units – megaregions – have superseded cities as the real
engines of the global economy’. This prompts us to confront the searching question
about whether the newly identified megaregional spaces actually exist as planning,
governance and economic spaces. Put bluntly: there has been little or no debate asking
if megaregions are internally coherent spaces. One notable exception is the distinction
Schafran (2014) makes between ‘megaregional space’ and ‘spaces of the megaregion’.
The latter relates to the unevenness of megaregionality within a pre-defined
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megaregion, drawing particular attention to those more localized spaces where it is
actually played out most clearly. This is in stark contrast to the megaregion itself, which
is constructed, mobilized and presented as a coherent space in order to achieve certain
political outcomes.
This brings us round to our fourth and final point. Deploying the language of
Allen et al. (1998, p. 2) ‘there is no complete “portrait of a [mega]region”. Moreover,
“[mega]regions” only exist in relation to particular criteria. They are not “out there”
waiting to be discovered, they are our (and others’) constructions.’ With this in mind, it
is important to acknowledge that if the formative work on megaregions has concentrated
on identifying where megaregional spaces and megaregionality are visible, the
questions which are central to future agendas for research are who is constructing
megaregional spaces, how are they constructing megaregional spaces, and why are they
constructing megaregional spaces. The who and why questions require us to identify the
actors involved in constructing megaregions politically, examine their motivations, and
ask in whose interest their actions are being directed. It necessitates the need to consider
which issues are being brought to the fore, and which are being pushed into the
background, within a megaregion framing of development. The how question
emphasizes the importance of the actual mechanisms through which megaregional space
is constructed politically, in particular, the tactics and strategies employed by actors to
advance their essential interests. It is in this way that we concur with the writings of the
political geographer John Agnew, who in an intriguingly titled article ‘Arguing with
regions’ reminds us that:
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[W]e should collectively invest in the plural of “regional logics”, tailoring usage
to the problems at hand, rather than in a singular logic that simply replaces the
romance of the nation-state with an equally simple and one-size-fits-all
alternative geographical unit of account such as … the global city-region.
(Agnew, 2013, p. 15)
While it is not difficult to envisage Agnew now replacing ‘global city-region’ with
‘megaregion’, it is what the quote signifies which is of importance here. Megaregions
mean different things to different actors in different contexts, each with different goals.
There is no one-size-fits-all megaregion. Geography and context matter.
1.3 Frailties: critical issues in megaregional research
1.3.1 Geographical excursions: a spiky world of megaregions, a spiky world of
megaregion interest
The world’s 40 largest mega-regions … cover only a tiny fraction of the
habitable surface of the earth and are home to less than 18% of the world’s
population; yet, they are responsible for 66% of global economic activity and
about 85% of technological and scientific innovation. (Florida et al., 2008, p.
474)
The scale and pace of China’s urbanization promises to continue at an
unprecedented rate. If current trends hold, China’s urban population will expand
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from 572 million in 2005 to 926 million in 2025 and hit the one billion mark by
2030. In 20 years, China’s cities will have added 350 million people – more than
the entire population of the United States today. By 2025, China will have 219
cities with more than one million inhabitants – compared with 35 in Europe
today – and 24 cities with more than five million people. (McKinsey Global
Institute, 2009, p. 1)
The two quotes refer to the ‘spiky world’ in which the megaregion debate is often
situated. The first, by Richard Florida and his colleagues, provides a global overview –
a somewhat placeless idiom of geographical concentration which is often found quoted
in the pages of glossy publications produced by prominent national and international
organizations to extoll the virtues of megaregional urban growth (see Parsons
Brinckerhoff, 2012; UN-Habitat, 2010a, 2010b). With such upbeat endorsements of the
potency of large-scale agglomeration economies it is hardly surprising that the next step
involves mapping where these megaregional spaces are located globally and providing a
snapshot of what a megaregional world / world of megaregions might look like (Florida
et al., 2008, 2012)3. By virtue of being a snapshot in time, this approach masks the
dynamism which the second quote alludes to. McKinsey Global Institute show, in
population terms, the dynamic geographical gravitation in interest from developments
occurring in the United States to the extraordinarily rapid urbanization underway in
China. Indeed, this brings us to our second point. As much as there is a spiky world of
megaregions, there is also a spiky world of megaregion interest.
If we look back over the past century what we see are some remarkably clear
periodizations of megaregional interest. Each periodization is characterized by the
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particular geographical focus and agenda which precipitated a growing interest in
analysing large-scale urban forms. For instance, we have already noted how during the
first half of the 20th century the putative megaregional research which emerged from
Europe – Geddes and his contemporaries – was heavily influenced by ecological and
environmentalist concerns and critiqued urban sprawl; then, during the 1960s, the
analytical gaze switched to the United States with Gottmann’s modernist and
progressive view of the new urban form sparking a North American dominated interest
in the concept of megaregions. We pick the story up in the 1980s with the acceleration
of globalization. At this time the focus had returned to Western Europe, and France in
particular. France laid the foundations for the European Spatial Development
Perspective (ESDP) when it convened a meeting of spatial planning and regional
development ministers from across the European Community in 1989 (Faludi and
Waterhout, 2002). Alongside this, DATAR4 commissioned a team of researchers led by
a geographer, Roger Brunet, to study the position of French territory in its European
context. The study identified a discontinuous urbanized corridor of industrial growth
running from northern England to northern Italy which it called the economic dorsale
(‘backbone’) of Europe (Brunet, 1989). Bypassing Paris and excluding most of France,
what became known as Europe’s ‘blue banana’ provided a clear political statement. The
French authors believed that in their national politics there had been excessive
centralization of activity and investment in Paris. Their riposte was to argue that in an
enlarged Europe, where the political-economic focus was gravitating to the east
following the accession of post-socialist countries (see Taylor and Hoyler, 2000), Paris
and the majority of French territory could no longer be seen as part of Europe’s
economic core. Nevertheless, the ESDP revamped the dorsale into a ‘pentagon’ and
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positioned it as a global economic integration zone – in effect, a megaregion – delimited
by the cities of London-Paris-Milan-Munich-Hamburg (Commission of the European
Communities, 1999).
The analytical gaze shifted further east in the 1990s in recognition of the rapid
urbanization underway in southeast Asia in general, and China in particular (McGee and
Robinson, 1995)5. This was the time when envious eyes were increasingly cast towards
the mega-city regional growth economies of the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas. This is
relevant because the ‘mega-city region’ approach – the ‘mega-city’ and its ‘region’ – is
a distinctly southeast Asian phenomenon, determined by city population and the
sprawling urban form (Hall, 1999; Xu and Yeh, 2011). This is significantly different
from a ‘global city-region’ – ‘global city’ and its region – where external and internal
functional linkages are the determining attribute (Hall, 2001). Megaregions could be
read as the attempt to weave the population-inspired mega-city region and functionally-
dominated global city-region concepts together. Certainly there is some evidence to
suggest this.
Through the work of North American scholars and the RPAs America 2050
initiative the United States is seen as leading the megaregion assault, proactively
responding to what they arguably see as the emergence of a megaregional world. Yet
we would argue that this work is more reactive than proactive. Citing prominent
European writers on European Spatial Development Planning practices – Faludi and
Waterhout (2002), Jensen and Richardson (2001) – Ross is clear in the opening salvo to
her book Megaregions – Planning for Global Competitiveness that ‘such planning has
set the stage for a more competitive Europe’ meaning it is crucial for economic
development practitioners in the United States to examine the ‘usefulness of the
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megaregion and spatial planning in an American context’ (Ross, 2009, p. 3). Likewise,
the RPA is explicit in justifying how their focus on megaregions largely results from
what ‘our competitors in Asia and Europe’ are doing (America 2050, 2013).
What this points towards is significant because it returns us to that fundamental
question – why megaregions? Our answer rests in the importance of recognizing that
different spatial concepts gained traction in different geographical contexts and at
different times. Prominent spatial concepts are those which endure and have salience in
a range of contexts. What marks megaregions out from other spatial concepts presently
is that for the first time in its history the megaregion has become a truly global concept.
Against the backdrop of the European Spatial Development Perspective and rapid
urbanization underway in southeast Asia, championing by its North American
promoters, and increasing prominence in other contexts (see UN-Habitat, 2010a, 2010b,
on the Global South; Pieterse, 2010, on Africa; Weller and Bolleter, 2013, on
Australia), what makes the megaregion stand out from other spatial concepts is the
enthusiasm it has generated internationally among academics, policymakers and
political leaders alike. The broader question this raises is why? More pointedly it
encourages us to ask what role globalization is playing, and whether megaregions do
constitute globalization’s new urban form?
1.3.2 From the visible to the invisible: examining megaregion form and function
A central tenet of megaregional research is the desire and need to define, designate and
delimit megaregional space. It cannot be overlooked that ‘to govern [or plan] it is
necessary to render the visible space over which government is to be exercised. This is
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not simply a matter of looking: space has to be represented, marked out’ (Thrift, 2002,
p. 205). Marking out space is a deeply political act and the case of megaregions is no
different. Our argument here is that this political act begins when researchers choose to
prioritize megaregional form or megaregional function as their entry point. Prioritizing
megaregional form leads researchers to start marking out space through observing what
is visible in the physical landscape (e.g. urban sprawl), whereas those who prioritize
megaregional function often begin by identifying what is less visible – even invisible –
in the physical landscape (e.g. flows of knowledge and capital). The result is very
different mappings of megaregional space and megaregionality. To illustrate this we
offer two contrasting examples of how megaregional space is being marked out.
The first approach is adopted by what we might call the ‘North American school
of megaregionalists’. Here the approach has been for researchers to consistently mark
out megaregional space by taking spatial form as their starting point (Carbonell and
Yaro, 2005; Florida et al., 2008; Lang and Knox, 2009; Nelson and Lang, 2011)6. In
each case the result has been, first, to designate a smaller number of larger urban-
regional economic units as globalization’s new urban form. In this way it is a very
spatially-selective approach, with only a minority (approximately 15-25 per cent) of the
population designated as being included within one of these megaregional spaces. But
perhaps more significantly, cartographic representations of megaregional space almost
always present these spaces as uniform (Figure 1.3). As a consequence there is an
unwitting tendency for form-dominated approaches to infer and/or assume the
functional coherence of the megaregional spaces they identify (cf. Burger and Meijers,
2012; Schafran, 2014, 2015).
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Figure 1.3 A form-dominant cartographic representation of megaregional space
*** Insert Figure 1.3 here ***
Source: Florida et al., 2008, p. 470. Reproduced by permission of RightsLink /
Oxford University Press.
This brings us to the second group – what we might tentatively call the
‘European School of megaregionalists’ – who adopt a functionally-dominated approach
to marking out megaregional space. Following Sassen’s (1991) identification of
advanced producer service firms as crucial actors and outcomes of deeper globalization
and localization processes, the starting point for these researchers is the premise that the
economic connections and information flows of business service firms provide ‘a
strategic lens to examine the intercity relations within larger urban regions and beyond
defined city-regional boundaries, nationally and transnationally’ (Hoyler et al., 2008b, 
p. 1055 original emphasis). This approach is perhaps most synonymous with the
research produced as part of the POLYNET project7 which saw researchers from across
Western Europe examine the functional geography of large-scale urban regions. In
contrast to form-dominated cartographic representations of megaregional space,
functionally-dominant cartographic representations are able to account for the
unevenness of megaregionality processes within the megaregional spaces they identify
(Figure 1.4). Moreover, the point we wish to stress is that prioritizing megaregional
function over megaregional form has the potential to reveal megaregional spaces which
although not appearing to be ‘megaregional’ in their physical manifestation – and by
virtue of this automatically closed off from consideration within form-dominant
approaches – do actually ‘punch-above-their-weight’ and act in a way which
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increasingly resembles processes of megaregionality. For sure these ‘imagined’ (Nelles,
2012) or im verborgenen (‘secret’ or ‘hidden’) (Thierstein et al., 2006) megaregional
spaces may be small in agglomeration terms but the economic connections and
information flows they have engendered through embedding business services firms
ensure they are functionally integrated with the global economy (for a prominent
example see Thierstein et al., 2008 on northern Switzerland).
Figure 1.4 A function-dominant cartographic representation of megaregional space
*** Insert Figure 1.4 here ***
Source: Hall and Pain, 2006, p. 85. Copyright © 2006 Earthscan. Reproduced by
permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.
We think this prompts the urgent need for megaregional research to examine in
which space-times form-dominant and functionally-dominant megaregional spaces are
complementary, overlapping, competing or contradictory. This will require researchers
to increasingly confront searching questions around whether form-first and function-
first approaches are complementary in specific geographical contexts and to consider
what the implications are – both academically, for the explanatory power of the
megaregion concept, and practically, for planning and governance at the scale of
megaregions – in places where they are (not).
1.3.3 Imagined megaregions? Megaregional space, spaces of the megaregion
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Over the past fifteen years the normative assumption that bigger equals more
competitive has undoubtedly fuelled a search for a smaller number of larger urban
economic units to be championed and lauded as being part on an increasingly exclusive
club at the apex of the global urban hierarchy (see Figure 1.2). One way this has been
achieved is the emergence of new urban-economic units which aggregate two or more
single urban systems into one larger (megaregional) urban system. We only have to
look at the names of the emerging megaregions to see examples of this. Of the 40
megaregions identified by Florida et al. (2008), 24 have conjoined names to designate a
megaregion constructed from combining two or more urban systems into a larger, single
urban system (e.g. Houston and New Orleans become ‘Hou-Orleans’). In this section
we seek to extend the discussion about form/functional dominance in megaregion
research to begin asking what, if anything, makes these megaregions coherent as
economic, but also political, cultural and institutional spaces? To answer this question
we suggest two levels of analysis are required.
The first is a macro-level analysis of megaregional space and involves
examining which urban systems have been aggregated to form these larger
‘megaregional’ urban systems and assessing their coherence as a single space. Our own
respective research on global city-regions and mega-city regions has highlighted how,
on a smaller scale, the evidence suggests that just because two urban systems are
located proximate to each other does not mean they can be aggregated up to form a
single, larger, more coherent and more competitive urban-economic unit. To take one
example, Liverpool and Manchester are UK cities located less than 50 km apart. As
single urban systems they do not have the critical mass to register as a global city-region
à la Scott (2001a, 2001b) nor compare favourably with international competitors. Yet
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together they have a population of 6 million, making the single urban-region
comparable to the RhineRuhr in Germany (5.3 million), the Rhône-Alpes in France (6.1
million) and the Randstad in the Netherlands (7.5 million). Part and parcel of what
Jonas (2013, p. 289) recently referred to as ‘internationally-orchestrated city-
regionalism’, certain policy elites mobilized in the late 2000s to advance the case for
bolstering competitiveness by politically constructing a single, globally competitive
urban space. Nonetheless, evidence pointed to their being ‘no tangible’ integration
between the two cities and stakeholders failed to ‘recognize’ the geography (Harrison,
2014). What this alerts us to is a pressing need to assess the functional coherence of
megaregional space. While we do not deny that some megaregional spaces are more
coherent than others, we do question the coherence of some purported megaregions and
mega urban corridors.
The second is a micro-level analysis of megaregional space. We start from a
position which acknowledges that there is an unevenness of megaregionality processes
across megaregional space (Sassen, 2007). From the financial district to the suburbs, the
parking lot to the shopping mall, the middle-classes to the working-classes, the
importance attached to this more localized level of analysis is the need to better
understand how processes of megaregionality impact different spaces, places and people
unevenly across megaregional space. A guiding question for future megaregional
research is (how) does the megaregion concept help in understanding the quite different
processes that are played out in these more localized spaces? In this way, Schafran’s
(2014) distinction between ‘megaregional space’ and ‘spaces of the megaregion’ helps
us to identify those spaces where megaregionality is more or less important. While we
think this is very useful, we would extend this further to include a temporal dimension.
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This has the advantage of not only providing a snapshot of where megaregionality is at
its strongest or weakest within megaregional space but has the capacity to identify local
spaces, places and people for whom processes of megaregionality are a dominant force,
a formerly dominant and now declining force, or a newly emerging force.
We think this is particularly important because it provides a starting point for
considering what we ultimately believe to be one of the most pressing concerns for
megaregional analysis – the geopolitics of megaregionalism. First and foremost, the two
levels of analysis we advocate above are capable of allowing researchers to reveal
which areas and social groups are included or excluded from megaregionalism as a
geopolitical project. More significantly, it creates the analytical lens necessary to begin
to answer the question of megaregionalism, by whom, for whom? For sure, we urgently
need more systematic examination of who is determining how megaregionalism is
constructed politically, why – and specifically, in whose interests – megaregionalism is
being mobilized, and how actors seek to defend and enhance their essential interests
through megaregionalism. Ultimately this is a question of governance.
1.3.4 Whose megaregion is it?
With all the hysteria surrounding megaregions over the past decade it is perhaps
unsurprising to note how few researchers have stopped to ask who is making this noise.
This is not to say that researchers have not mentioned the groups involved – in fact,
there are few accounts which fail to variously mention America 2050, the Regional Plan
Association and the ESDP – rather it is to suggest that this is the extent of their
interrogation of who is involved in promoting megaregions. Only a few writers have
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lingered long enough to consider the critically important questions: Which voices are
being heard (the loudest) in the megaregion debate? What do these actors stand to gain
from megaregions? Which voices are not being heard? Are certain voices being
deliberately excluded (if so, why)? Who decides which voices are heard? These are the
key questions we argue need to be at the heart of a more critical analysis of
megaregions.
The rise of the megaregion has been underpinned by a strong geoeconomic
logic. The rhetoric surrounding megaregions is undeniably one of economic boosterism
supported by neoliberal pro-growth models of how economic development and
competitiveness is to be achieved in our rapidly changing global economy. In this way it
is unsurprising that powerful interest groups – federal and state governments, business
and industry leaders, private investment groups, property and real-estate developers –
have been prepared to form alliances to extract value from planning at the scale of
megaregions. There is a strong argument that powerful actors mobilize in support of the
megaregion concept only where they see the potential for planning at this scale to
defend and enable their essential interests to be realized. This could be national
government decisions on which high-speed rail routes to prioritize for funding, the
location and/or expansion of major national infrastructure sites, or the competition
between container terminals to be key docking points for post-Panamax cargo vessels.
What is significant about this in the context of the megaregion is that at this scale these
decisions have moved from the multi-million pound infrastructure investments
commonly associated with planning at the metropolitan scale, to the multi-billion
investment decisions which were traditionally the sole domain of national politics.
Simply put, the stakes are now higher than ever.
25
One practical illustration of this is the close connection between the Regional
Plan Association’s America 2050 programme and the US Department of Transportation.
It is no secret that much of the support for work on the megaregion concept came from
the US Department of Transportation, for whom the megaregion is a vehicle through
which they can raise the profile of what they see as the benefits of high-speed rail for
economic development. The megaregion concept enables the department to secure the
backing of key business leaders, investment groups and state officials to present a
stronger business case on the need for more federal investment in high-speed rail and
rail passenger capacity. Furthermore, the megaregion framework allows the Department
of Transportation to lobby more vociferously on a national scale, therefore increasing
the likelihood that they can win (some of) the arguments necessary to deliver one of
their key political goals. With this in mind it is not surprising they were prepared to
fund the academic research on megaregions necessary to develop this stronger business
case for high-speed rail and increased rail passenger capacity. But by virtue of this the
focus has been almost exclusively on issues of transportation8. Indeed, the only
megaregion planning to emerge has related to specific policy spheres: there is no
evidence of genuine economic development strategies in the traditional sense.
All of which places the spotlight on what, if anything, megaregions mean for
other actors, particularly those whose voice is often not heard so loudly? In other words,
what traction does the megaregion concept have among other stakeholder groups? One
such area is sustainability which is currently receiving increased attention. There are
those who, on the one hand, see coordinating economic development on the scale of
megaregions as presenting opportunities to take a more strategic view on nationally
significant planning decisions – land and resource issues, high-speed rail networks,
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transition to a low-carbon economy through large-scale investment in non-renewables
production plants (e.g. industrial scale wind farms). On the other hand, there are those
who oppose planning on the megaregional scale because it is perceived to be the
extreme antithesis of the need to move towards more local and sustainable communities.
Here the focus is on leading simpler, lower consumption, lifestyles, where energy
production is decentralized to the scale of the household / community, supporting local
business is prioritized over global corporations, and slower-speed modes of
transportation (walking, bicycles, public transit) take precedent over the clamour for
ever faster-modes (larger freeways, more high-speed rail, grater airport capacity).
Research is already beginning to examine the potential contribution of megaregions to
economic development and the objective of smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth
(Benner and Pastor, 2011; Fleming, 2015; Marull et al., 2013; Ross et al., 2015;
Wheeler, 2009, 2015).
If examining who is involved in promoting megaregions – and what they stand
to gain – is one way of moving towards a more critical analysis of megaregions, a
second way is to consider which geographical areas are included, on the fringes or
excluded from the discursive framing of megaregions. Once again we return to the
question of how megaregions are constructed geopolitically. Three examples elucidate
our thinking on this point. First, Faludi (2009) points to the geopolitical construction of
the ESDPs ‘Pentagon’ as an example of how policy elites configured this spatial
imaginary to ensure a catchy 20-40-50 tagline (20 per cent of EU territory, 40 per cent
of the EU population, 50 per cent of EU GDP generated) could be used as a branding
and marketing tool for economic boosterism.
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Second, the definition used by Lang and Dhavale (2005) to identify
‘megapolitan regions’ from US Census data is that to be included regions must combine
at least two metropolitan areas and have a total population of 10 million residents by
2040. What is interesting to note is that out of the ten megapolitan regions they identify,
eight already had over 10 million residents by the year 2000 – so why 2040? Might it be
that there was a need to alter the definition to ensure the two remaining regions –
Cascadia and Valley of the Suns – which do not currently have 10 million residents,
were captured and included within the discursive frame? Off the map by standard
criteria, certainly there is a long-standing argument to suggest this might be the case
(see Harrison, 2010; Hoyler et al., 2006). Cascadia, for example, has a resident
population of 7.5 million but it is arguably the strongest political advocate of large-scale
economic cross-border regions. Supported by secession activists who campaign for
Cascadian independence, Cascadia has one of the strongest cultural identities and
movements (cf. Fleming, 2015), as well as a resident population of over 10 million if
you take into account areas located beyond the US national border that are within the
cultural region. They therefore represent a powerful political voice and their inclusion
within the discursive frame of megaregions has some politico-cultural merits. Similarly
for the Valley of the Sun (or Arizona Sun Corridor), which, although only having a
resident population of 5 million, is a rapidly expanding regional growth economy. So
capturing successful regional economies within the framing of megapolitan regions /
megaregions clearly has its merits.
The third example requires us to look at how international organizations such as
UN-Habitat (the United Nations Human Settlements Programme) have captured the
concept of megaregions to advance their own particular political message and
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aspirations. UN-Habitat offer a revealing insight into the geopolitical construction of
different megaregion discourses because in their annual State of the World’s Cities
Report for 2010-11 they not only gave prominent billing to megaregions, they
constructed a very particular discourse around the development opportunities
megaregions offered countries across the Global South (UN-Habitat, 2010a). What is
striking about this report is although their map identifies megaregions and mega-urban
corridors in North America and Europe, these spaces were excluded from the narrative.
The narrative, reflected most clearly in the press release which accompanied the report’s
publication, is exclusively constructed around the development potential afforded by
megaregions in southeast Asia, South America, and Africa (UN-Habitat, 2010b). From
these examples what we see is that understanding how the megaregion concept is
constructed to fit particular stories is a crucial, yet somewhat under-researched,
dimension of megaregional research.
1.4 Futures: megaregions as globalization’s new urban form?
Our ambition for embarking on this project has been to prompt more critical analyses of
megaregions, megaregionality and the megaregion concept. By setting out to provide an
introduction to what we hope will become a wider debate on megaregions, we have
encouraged contributors to be more provocative than they may otherwise be in their
academic writing. To facilitate this we asked authors to specifically address three
questions in their chapters:
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 How robust are the foundations upon which the megaregion concept has been
constructed?
 What are the methodological challenges of researching megaregions?
 Do megaregions constitute ‘globalization’s new urban form’? If not, are there
alternative (more suitable) spatial frameworks?
Linking these central themes is the argument that in order to advance intellectual and
practical debates on megaregions, attention needs to be focused on the who, the how and
the why of megaregions much more than the what and the where of megaregions. Our
aim is to move the debate forward from questions of definition, identification and
delimitation to questions of agency (who or what is constructing megaregions), process
(how are megaregions being constructed) and specific interests (why are megaregions
being constructed); something which, we argue, requires a more political and more
historical perspective on megaregions (Harrison and Hoyler, 2015).
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Table 1.1
Concept Definition Minimum
population
Maximum
population
Geography Number Foundational
literature
Megalopolis “[V]ery large polynuclear urbanized systems
endowed with enough continuity and internal
interconnections for them to be considered a
system in itself.” (Gottmann, 1976, p. 162)
25 million Not
specified
Northeastern
United States
1 Gottmann (1961)
Global city-
region
“[D]ense polarized masses of capital, labour,
and social life that are bound up in intricate
ways in intensifying and far-flung extra-
national relationships. As such, they represent
an outgrowth of large metropolitan areas—or
contiguous sets of metropolitan areas—together
with surrounding hinterlands of variable extent
which may themselves be sites of scattered
urban settlements.” (Scott, 2001a, p. 814)
1 million 27.9 million Global >300 Scott (2001a,
2001b)
Mega-city
region
“[A] series of anything between 10 and 50
cities and towns, physically separate but
functionally networked, clustered around one
or more larger central cities, and drawing
enormous economic strength from a new
functional division of labour.” (Hall and Pain,
2006, p. 3)
1.6 million 19 million Western
Europe
8 Hall and Pain
(2006)
40
Metro(politan)
regions
“[L]arge concentrations of population and
economic activity that constitute functional
economic areas, typically covering a number of
local government areas. An economic area in
this sense denotes a geographic space within
which a number of economic links are
concentrated.” (OECD, 2006, p. 31)
1.5 million 34 million OECD 78 OECD (2006)
Megaregions “[I]ntegrated sets of cities and their
surrounding suburban hinterlands across which
labour and capital can be reallocated at very
low cost … perform[ing] functions that are
somewhat similar to those of the great cities of
the past … but they do this on a far larger
scale.” (Florida et al., 2008, pp. 459-460)
“[N]etworks of metropolitan centers and their
surrounding areas … spatially and functionally
linked through environmental, economic, and
infrastructure interactions.” (Ross, 2009, p. 1)
3.7 million
20 million
5 million
121.6
millioni
120 million
54 million
Global
Global
United States
40
Not
specified
11
Florida et al.
(2008)
UN-Habitat
(2010a, 201b)
Ross (2009)
Planetary
urbanization
“[E]ven spaces that lie well beyond the
traditional city cores and suburban peripheries
– from transoceanic shipping lanes … [to]
erstwhile ‘natural’ spaces such as the world’s
oceans, deserts, jungles, mountain ranges,
n/a 7 billion + Global 1 Brenner (2013a,
2013b); Brenner
and Schmid (2011)
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tundra, and atmosphere – have become integral
parts of the worldwide urban fabric” (Brenner
and Schmid, 2011, p. 13)
i The largest megaregion of 121.6 million is Pearl River Delta. It is worth noting that back in 2009 it was reported that plans were afoot to
expand the region politically so the population of the Pearl River Delta would reach 260 million (Forbes, 2011).
Source: Authors
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Figure 1.2
Source: Authors
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1 August Hecksher was Director of The Twentieth Century Fund who had funded much
of Gottmann’s research into urbanization of megalopolis.
2 Here we are also reminded of a quote by the English writer G.K. Chesterton, who in
his 1905 book Heretics commented that ‘Nothing more strangely indicates an enormous
and silent evil of modern society than the extraordinary use which is made nowadays of
the word “orthodoxy” … The word ‘orthodoxy’ not only no longer means being right; it
practically means being wrong’ (pp. 11-12).
3 Here we are making this distinction to emphasise our belief that we live in a world
with, not of, megaregions. ‘Megaregional world’ is where the onus is on the importance
of megaregions shaping the world we live in, that is, there is something fundamental
connecting megaregions to globalization. We prefer ‘world of megaregions’ because
this recognizes that while we live in a world where there are megaregions and processes
of megaregionality this is not to say there is something fundamental connecting
megaregions to globalization.
4 DATAR is the French Interministerial Delegation for Regional Planning and Regional
Attractiveness. It was set up by President Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s to promote the
development of French regions as a counterbalance to Paris. When Jacques Chirac, a
former mayor of Paris, became Prime Minister, then later President of France,
DATAR’s raison d'être lost its political influence. Its future existence was founded on
conceptualizing French territory in the fast evolving European context (Faludi, 2009).
5 It would be remiss not to acknowledge that this mega-city regional literature extended
beyond southeast Asia to include many accounts of similar processes occurring across
parts of Latin America and Africa.
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6 This is not to say there is a uniform approach – one only has to look in the United
States at the epistemological differences between megaregionalists, who concentrate on
traditional urban-regional planning concerns, and megapolitanists, whose focus is on
interpreting US Census data (Fleming, 2015) – rather it is to highlight how this
approach is qualitatively different from the more functionally-dominant approach which
has been central within European debate.
7 POLYNET (or “POLYNET: Sustainable Management of European Polycentric Mega-
City Regions” to give its full title) was a €2.4 million research project funded by the
European Regional Development Fund under the INTERREG IIIB North West Europe
programme between 2003-2006. The aim was to examine changes in functional
connections and information flows (physical/transportation and virtual/ICT) in eight
major urban regions across North West Europe: South East England, the Paris Region,
Central Belgium, the Randstad, Rhine-Main, RhineRuhr, Northern Switzerland and
Greater Dublin. The principal project outcomes are reported in Hall and Pain (2006),
Halbert et al. (2006) and Hoyler et al. (2008a).
8 You only have to look at the America 2050 website (http://www.america2050.org/) to
see the predominance of transportation issues in the debate over megaregions in the
United States.
